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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - How the Fourth Amendment
Applies to Public High School Students -
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
FACTS
A teacher at Piscataway High School in Piscataway, New Jer-
sey, observed Terry Lee Owens (T.L.O.) and another student
smoking cigarettes in the restroom. Although permitted in desig-
nated areas of the school, smoking was prohibited in the restrooms.
The teacher escorted the two students to the assistant principal.
The other student admitted she had been smoking in the restroom,
and was ordered to attend a smoking clinic for three days as
punishment. T.L.O. denied smoking and claimed that she did not
smoke at all.
The assistant principal ushered T.L.O. into his private office
where he asked to look through her purse. The examination of
the purse immediately revealed a pack of cigarettes and a pack-
age of cigarette rolling papers. The assistant principal then looked
further into her purse and found a metal pipe, empty plastic bags,
a plastic bag containing marijuana, an index card with a list of
names under the caption "people who owe me money," forty dol-
lars in small bills, and two letters which implicated T.L.O. in
drug selling.
The assistant principal called the police and T.L.O.'s mother,
and turned the evidence of drug dealing over to the police. At
the request of the police, T.L.O.'s mother took T.L.O. to the police
station where she admitted selling marijuana at the high school.
On the basis of the confession and the evidence seized by the as-
sistant principal, the state brought delinquency charges against
T.L.O. in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. She also
received a three-day suspension from school for smoking and a
seven-day suspension for possession of marijuana.
In the delinquency proceeding brought by the state, T.L.O.
moved to dismiss the complaint and suppress the evidence.1 This
motion was based on two arguments. The first was based upon
a Chancery Division proceeding wherein T.L.O. had brought a
complaint against the school to show cause why she should not
be reinstated in school. The judge upheld the suspension for smok-
ing but vacated the suspension for possession of marijuana, find-
ing that the suspension resulted from evidence obtained in a
warrantless search which violated the fourth amendment.2 T.L.O.
1. State in Interest of T.L.O., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 428 A.2d 1327 (1980).
2. Id. at 334, 428 A.2d at 1329.
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argued at the delinquency hearing that the criminal charge should
be barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.' Second, she
argued that the search and seizure was unlawful and sought to
suppress the evidence.' The court, holding that resjudicata and
collateral estoppel did not apply, and that the search was reason-
able, denied her motion.'
The New Jersey appellate court affirmed the denial of the mo-
tion to suppress the evidence but found the record and conclu-
sions of the trial judge inadequate on the issue of the sufficiency
of the Miranda waiver asserted by T.L.O. The court vacated the
adjudication of delinquency and remanded for further proceed-
ings.6 The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and ordered the
evidence suppressed because the search was unreasonable and vio-
lated T.L.O.'s fourth amendment rights." The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search of T.L.O.'s purse
was not unreasonable under the fourth amendment.'
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.'
Early on, the Supreme Court interpreted the fourth amendment
to apply to all invasions by the government of the sanctities of
home and privacies of life, and any evidence obtained by such
an illegal invasion was inadmissible in subsequent proceedings.'
The "government" was interpreted to mean the federal govern-
ment and its employees. 1 In Weeks v. United States, 2 the Court
held that to admit evidence illegally seized from a person's home
by federal officers would be to judicially approve open defiance
of the fourth amendment's protective restrictions on searches and
seizures.13 However, the Supreme Court distinguished evidence
3. Id. at 335, 428 A.2d at 1330.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 345, 428 A.2d at 1336.
6. State in Interest of T.L.O., 185 N.3. Super. 279, 448 A.2, 493 (1982).
7. State in Interest of T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983).
8. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-46 (1985).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. Boyde v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
11. Id. at 630.
12. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
13. Id.
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obtained by government officials from evidence obtained by pri-
vate citizens and turned over to federal agents: the fourth amend-
ment does not apply to private citizens obtaining evidence." Also,
for years the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment did
not apply to the states in excluding evidence obtained in an ille-
gal search and seizure. 5 Finally, in Wolf v. Colorado," the Court
held that the fourth amendment applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. 7 The Weeks exclusionary rule, however,
was not applied to the states because it did not "derive explicitly
from the Fourth Amendment." 8 Later, Elkins v. United States9
struck down the "silver platter" doctrine, which allowed admis-
sion of illegally seized evidence by the state into federal courts."
Finally, in Mapp v. Ohio," the Court overruled Wolf, holding
that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissable in a
state court.22
Fourth Amendment Application to Criminal Procedure
The Supreme Court has held that the usual fourth amendment
criminal procedure standard is that warrantless searches are un-
reasonable and violate the fourth amendment unless the exigen-
cies of the situation make a warrantless search imperative or one
of the exceptions applies.23 The Court has developed six narrow
exceptions to the warrant requirement in criminal procedure: 1)
searches incident to lawful arrest, "4 2) automobile searches, 2 3)
14. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1920).
15. Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 76 (1855).
16. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 28.
19. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
20. Id.
21. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22. Id. at 655.
23. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
24. Warrantless searches are valid after a valid arrest and evidence obtained from such a search is admissa-
ble because the arrest upon probable cause justifies the search. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
See also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). In 1969, however, the Court overturned this kind
of limitless search based on valid arrest. It restricted the search to "a search of the arestee's person and the
area 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Of course,
without a valid arrest, a search is not valid and evidence obtained from such a search is inadmissabte. Beck
v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
25. The Supreme Court, recognizing the need for warrantless searches of automobiles, reasoned in Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) that
[tlhe Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling, house or other structure in
respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat,
wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because
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hot pursuit and other exigent circumstances,"6 4) consent,27 5) plain
view,"8 and 6) the stop-and-frisk exception which provides the
starting point for analyzing the instant case. The exceptions for
consent and plain view do not depend on exigency like the others
do, but all are based on probable cause except the stop-and-frisk
exception.
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Id. at 153. The standard for such a stop and search is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband.
Id. at 155. See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). This principle was expanded in Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), where there was probable cause to believe that a car contained armed rob-
bers. The tools of the robbery obtained from the subsequent search of the car's interior after the car was towed
to the police station were admissible into evidence. A recent case, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982),
clarifies the extent of a Carroll search. Here, the police officers stopped a suspect, based on a tip from an
informant, and opened his trunk and a brown paper bag in the trunk which contained contraband. Later at
the police station, the officers opened a zippered pouch found in the car, which contained currency. Both the
currency and contraband were admitted into evidence. The Court upheld both searches, reasoning that "[i]f
probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the
vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search." Ross, 456 U.S. at 825. Several years before,
in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the Court had held that because, under Carroll, 267
U.S. 132 (1925), standards are lower for an automobile, an inventory search of a car secured by police after
a parking violation was valid as long as the procedure is a standardized one. Contraband found by such a search
is admissible into evidence because the search was reasonable.
26. The exception for hot pursuit applies to arrest of fleeing felons in their homes. In Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967), the Court upheld the warrantless entry into and search of a robbery suspect's home in
order to locate him after he fled the scene of a robbery. The Court also upheld a warrantless search of the
house for weapons or accomplices, reasoning that "Isipeed here was essential, and only a thorough search of
the house for persons and weapons could have insured that Hayden was the. only man present and that the
police had control of all weapons which could be used against them or to effect an escape." Warden, 387 U.S.
at 299. Later, in United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), the Court upheld a warrantless entry into the
suspect's home after she had retreated there to avoid a proper arrest, based on probable cause, in a public
place. The subsequent search which produced drugs and money was also upheld because any delay would have
resulted in the destruction of the evidence. Santana, 427 U.S. at 38. The Court characterized this situation
as a "true 'hot pursuit' " and that "the need to act quickly here is even greater than in that case [Warden v.
HaydenA while the intrusion is much less." Santana, 427 U.S. at 42. The Court has limited the hot pursuit
exception most recently in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984). Here, police entered a man's home without
a warrant to arrest him for driving while intoxicated, based solely on a witness, report that the man had driven
his car off the road and walked away. The Court found that such a warrantless entry and seizure for a civil,
nonjailable traffic offense was prohibited by the fourth amendment. Id. at 754.
27. A logical exception to a warrant search is search by consent. If consent to a search is voluntarily given,
it is permissible for the police to conduct the search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Consent
to a search may also be given by a person other than the defendant if the relationship is such that the defendant
assumed the risk that this person would consent to a search. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969). It is also
permissible for the police to conduct a search based on consent even if the police could have just as easily
obtained a search warrant. State v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
28. The plain view doctrine embodies another exception to the warrant requirement for search and seizure.
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), held that if the entry on the property was authorized, any evi-
dence of a crime in plain view could be seized and used as evidence. Again, the Court restricted this doctrine
to the arrestee's person in the case of valid arrest, and to the immediate area in the case of valid attest and
other authorized entries upon the property. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), extended the plain view doctrine to include a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement, but warned that the doctrine could not be used to conduct a general search from "one
object to another until something incriminating at last emerges." Id. at 466. Also, a valid plain view seizure
depended upon a valid prior intrusion, inadvertent discovery of the objects, and whether it is immediately ap-
parent that the objects are evidence of a crime. Id. at 443. For a valid plain view seizure, the initial prior
intrusion, then, must be either pursuant to a warrant or based on one of the exceptions.
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The stop-and-frisk exception to the warrant requirement for
search and seizure, on which the Court relies in the instant case,
is set out in Terry v. Ohio.29 The Court recognized the necessity
of allowing police officers to stop someone on reasonable suspi-
cion to prevent a crime, regardless of whether there was proba-
ble cause to arrest the person.30 Also, in order to protect the lives
of the police officer and bystanders, the Court allowed a search
for weapons based on reasonable belief that the suspect is armed. 1
The Court articulated reasonable suspicion for a stop as "conduct
which leads him [police officer] reasonably to conclude in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dan-
gerous."3" The Court emphasized that the officer's "suspicion" could
not be just a hunch, but must be "reasonable inferences which
he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience." 3
A search may arise from this stop only if the officer identifies
himself as a police officer, makes reasonable inquiries, and still
fears for his and others' safety." The search must be limited to
the outer clothing and to the discovery of weapons which might
be used against the officer.3 Weapons seized at this search may
be used as evidence against the person on charges of carrying a
concealed weapon. 36
In a case decided the same day as Terry, the Court emphasized
that the stop had to be based on reasonable suspicion, defined as
something that "suggest[s] particular criminal activity, complet-
ed, current, or intended.""' Without this kind of reasonable sus-
picion, there is no right to conduct a search for weapons. 8 In this
companion case, the officer had seen the suspect talking with two
known drug addicts over a period of eight hours. He had observed
nothing else suspicious about his behavior. He seized the suspect
in a restaurant and subsequently searched him, finding drugs. 9
The Court held that the stop was not based on reasonable suspi-
cion to prevent a crime and the search was not based on reason-
able belief that the suspect carried a weapon."°
29. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
30. Id. at 29.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 30.
33. Id at 27.
34. Id. at 30.
35. id.
36. Id. at 31.
37. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 73 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 65.
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It may be argued that the Court expanded the Terry stop to in-
clude not only crime prevention, but also crime detection. In
Adams v. Williams,"1 the officer stopped a suspect based on a tip
from a known informant that the suspect was presently carrying
narcotics and a concealed weapon. 2 When the suspect refused
to get out of the car, the officer reached in and seized the weapon
from where he had been informed the weapon would be carried.4"
The Court upheld the validity of the stop and the seizure of the
weapon.44
In recent years the Court has applied the Terry stop-and-frisk
exception to situations where narcotics agents have reasonable
grounds to suspect that a person is transporting narcotics. The
Court has held strictly to the concept that the stop must be only
long enough to dispel the suspicion that a crime is being commit-
ted. For example, in Florida v. Royer,"5 a plurality opinion, the
suspect was taken to a small room at an airport for further ques-
tioning, and there the narcotics agents obtained the key to the sus-
pect's suitcase but not his consent to search the suitcase.46 The
Court held that the evidence of narcotics found in the suitcase
could not be used to convict because the detention was more in-
trusive than necessary to conduct the brief questioning permissi-
ble under the Terry exception. 7 The subsequent search was
therefore invalid.48 Likewise, in United States v. Place,49 deten-
tion of the suspect's bag for ninety minutes, even though on
reasonable grounds for suspicion of transporting narcotics, ex-
ceeded the limits of the Terry exception. 0 These later cases up-
hold the Terry standard, i.e., that the stop must be based on
reasonable suspicion to prevent or detect a crime, and that the
stop must be brief or it may well become an illegal seizure.
Another recent case extended the Terry search for weapons be-
yond the outer clothing of the person to the passenger compart-
ment of the car. Michigan v. Long"' validated the search of an
automobile in those areas where a weapon could be hidden.52 In
this case, the officer reasonably believed, based on" 'specific and
41. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 145.
44. Id. at 149.
45. 460 U.S. 491 (1993).
46. Id. at 494.
47. Id. at 504.
48. Id. at 507-08.
49. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
50. Id. at 709-10.
51. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
52. Id. at 1049-52.
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articulable facts . . . taken together with the rational inferences
from those facts . . .' "that the suspect was dangerous and might
gain immediate control of weapons."'
The Court, in fashioning the Terry standard, adopted a version
of the balancing test which it had set out the year before for ad-
ministrative searches in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Fran-
cisco. 4 The Terry standard balances the interests of crime
prevention and protection of officers' and bystanders' lives against
the slight intrusion required for a weapons search." These com-
peting interests have to be balanced on the facts of the individual
case, but the intrusion can be based on less than probable cause.5 6
The Court also has applied this balancing test to the border patrol
cases, relying on both Terry7 and Camara. 8
Fourth Amendment Application to Border Searches
Border patrol officers have historically been required to observe
a less stringent standard for search and seizure than that provid-
ed by the fourth amendment. Searches at the border may be con-
ducted without a warrant and without probable cause. 9 Under the
Camara" balancing test, the competing interests are searches limit-
ed to persons who seek to enter our country and a strong national
sovereignty interest in preventing illegal entry of persons and sub-
stances. However, questions about the validity of stops and
searches arise as to fixed checkpoints and roving patrols once the
aliens have crossed the border. Distance from the border is one
factor to be considered. The standard for a search of a car by
a roving patrol at points away from the vicinity of the border is
probable cause to believe that the car contains illegal aliens." The
Court applied the same standard for a vehicle search at a perma-
nent check-point stop at points away from the border. ' In the
general area of the border, however, the border patrol can stop
53. Id. at 1049, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1967). The officers investigated this car after they
had observed it erratically weaving down the road and swerving off into a ditch. They observed a hunting
knife on the floorboard of the driver's side. The officers then did a pat-down of Mr. Long for weapons and
did a general search of the interior of the car for weapons. The car search revealed marijuana stashed under
the armrest of the front seat. The marijuana was allowed into evidence because the initial search was valid.
Id. at 1035-36.
54. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
55. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
56. Id. at 27.
57. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
58. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
59. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977).
60. Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See supra text accompanying note
58 and infra text accompanying notes 67-71.
61. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
62. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
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a car based on reasonable suspicion that the car contains illegal
aliens." But the stop must be brief and the questions about citizen-
ship and/or suspicious circumstances must be reasonably related
to the circumstances which gave rise to the suspicion. °" A search
must be based on probable cause. 5 The Court held that at fixed
checkpoints near the border, vehicles may be stopped without even
reasonable suspicion as long as the occupants are only briefly ques-
tioned and no searches are involved.6
Fourth Amendment Application to Administrative Searches
In Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco,7 the Court
upheld the right of a resident to require a warrant before admit-
ting a housing inspector to inspect the premises .68 However, the
Court went on to say that probable cause, for which the warrants
are to be issued, was to be based upon the reasonableness of the
agency's appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole, not on
a particular dwelling.6" The Court recognized that prevention of
conditions which could be hazardous to public health and safety
was a legitimate governmental interest requiring a housing inspec-
tion search, but the Court balanced this interest against the neces-
sity of protecting the citizens against intrusive searches. If the
agency had reasonable cause to inspect, the Court reasoned, the
probable cause requirement for obtaining a warrant would be met.7"
During the same term, the Court ruled that a warrant was neces-
sary for inspection of commercial property not open to public use.'1
The Court later recognized that a statutory scheme which regu-
lated an industry could provide for inspection without notice. Such
a provision in the statute had the effect of a warrant by giving
notice that inspections would routinely be carried out.'2 In the case
of gun control, the Gun Control Act gave statutory notice of war-
rantless searches' and in the case of liquor licenses, Congress
had made it an offense to refuse admission to a liquor license in-
spector." The Court has continued to uphold the necessity of a
63. United States v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975).
64. Id. at 881-82.
65. Id. at 882.
66. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
67. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 538.
70. Id. at 539.
71. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967).
72. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 601-02 (1981) (Mine Safety Act gives notice that warrantless searches
will be carried out.).
73. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972).
74. Colonnade Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
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warrant or statutory scheme in administrative searches by hold-
ing that in the absence of a warrant or statutory scheme, warrant-
less searches are invalid under the fourth amendment."
Fourth Amendment Application to School Settings by State and
Federal Courts
State court decisions regarding fourth amendment application
to school settings can generally be categorized into four groups:
nonapplication, full application, reasonable suspicion standard
reduced by the in loco parentis doctrine, and application of the
fourth amendment but not the exclusionary rule. A much quoted
case, Mercer v. State,76 held that the fourth amendment did not
apply to a search of a high school student and subsequent seizure
of marijuana by the principal because the principal "acted in loco
parentis, not as an arm of the government."77 The evidence was
turned over to the police and the student was adjudged a delin-
quent child.78 However, another often quoted case, State v. Mora,9
held that principals and instructors, as state employees responsi-
ble for public education, came within the purview of the fourth
amendment.8" Furthermore, that court determined that a "search
on school grounds of a student's personal effects by a school offi-
cial who suspects the presence or possession of some unlawful
substance" did not fall within an exception to a warrantless search
and the evidence could not be used in criminal prosecution. 8
Between these two extremes, state courts have not required war-
rants for a school search, and probable cause has been reduced
to reasonable suspicion. A Delaware Superior Court decision de-
termined that the fourth amendment applies to school officials but
that the doctrine of in loco parentis balances against the fourth
amendment rights and reduces the standard necessary to initiate
a search from probable cause to reasonable suspicion.82 A Flori-
da District Court of Appeals adopted this reasonable suspicion
standard but the decision is unclear as to whether it viewed school
officials as an arm of the state government or as in loco paren-
tis. 83 Another variation came from the Supreme Court of Geor-
gia, which held that the fourth amendment applies to school
75. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978).
76. 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)
71. Id. at 717.
78. Id. at 716-17. See also D.C.R. v. State, 646 P.2d 252, 254 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); R.C.M. v. State,
660 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex. App. 1983).
79. 307 So. 2d 317, vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976).
80. Id. at 319.
81. Id. at 320.
82. State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869, 872 (Del. Super. 1971).
83. Nelson v. State, 319 So. 2d 154, 156 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975).
19861
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
officials conducting warrantless searches but that the standard was
reduced from probable cause to reasonable suspicion.14 This court,
however, distinguished between government agents and law en-
forcement agents, holding that the exclusionary rule does not ap-
ply to evidence obtained in an invalid search by government agents
such as school officials.85 Students whose fourth amendment rights
have been violated must seek other legal remedies aside from hav-
ing the illegally obtained evidence suppressed in criminal proceed-
ings. "
The federal district and circuit courts, while agreeing that the
fourth amendment applies to school officials conducting searches,
have been inconsistent about the standard for the search. They
have upheld at least an individualized reasonable suspicion stan-
dard for a body search, and in somecases have moved to the strict-
er probable cause standard. In Bilbrey v. Brown,8 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that school officials should have had probable cause to
suspect, or at least a reasonable belief, that two fifth grade stu-
dents possessed drugs before they conducted a body search and
that school officials were not immune from prosecution for fail-
ing to obey this standard. One federal district court ruled that
a search, and an eventual strip search, of an entire classroom for
missing money was invalid, "there being no reasonable suspicion
to believe that each student searched possessed contraband or evi-
dence of crime."89 The Seventh Circuit held that a strip search
of a thirteen-year-old by school officials for drugs after a dog sniff
reaction was "an invasion of constitutional rights of some magni-
tude."" The Fifth Circuit held that canine sniff investigations of
school lockers and automobiles were not searches under the fourth
amendment, but that canine sniff investigations of bodies were
searches and, without individual probable cause, were invalid. 1
Other federal courts have held that a reasonable suspicion stan-
dard applies to searches but that the evidence thus obtained may
be used only in hearings to determine school suspension."2 In fact,
the Sixth Circuit specifically stated that its decision did not reach
the issue of whether the reasonable suspicion standard would be
84. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 496, 216 S.E.2d 586, 592 (1975).
85. Id. at 494, 216 S.E.2d at 591.
86. Id.
87. 738 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1984).
88. Id.
89. Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 54 (N.D. N.Y. 1977).
90. Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92 (7th Cir. 1980).
91. Horton v. Goose Creek Ind. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 482 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1207 (1983).
92. M. v. Board of Educ. Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No. 5,429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (S.D.
111. 1977).
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enough if the evidence were handed over to the police for crimi-
nal prosecution.93 Finally, a federal district court held that a prob-
able cause standard must be met when a warrantless school search
was conducted at the request of and in conjunction with the
police.94
The Supreme Court's Rulings on Other Constitutional Rights of
Public School Students.
While each constitutional right has a different history and ba-
sis for interpretation and application, an overview of the Supreme
Court's posture toward public school students and their constitu-
tional rights reveals a balancing of absolute rights against govern-
mental needs. West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,95 in a strongly worded opinion, held that the "action of
the local authorities [Board of Education] in compelling the flag
salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their
power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is
the purpose of the first amendment . . . to reserve from all offi-
cial control."96 This opinion came in response to a school board's
expelling students who refused on religious principles to salute
and pledge to the flag. The Court held that the first amendment
applied to these students through the fourteenth amendment, which
"protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures -
Boards of Education not excepted."97 The Court pointed out,
however, that the students' refusal to salute and pledge conflicted
with no other student's rights."9
Similarly, the Court held in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District9 that students who were suspended
from school for wearing black armbands in protest of the hostili-
ties in Vietnam had been denied their first amendment rights, say-
ing that "[ilt can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expres-
sion at the schoolhouse gate.""' The Court was again careful to
point out that the protest did "not concern aggressive, disruptive
action or even group demonstrations,"" and that the armbands
did not conflict with any other student's rights or with the respon-
sibility of school officials to control conduct in the schools.1'
93. Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 984 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
94. Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. IWl. 1976).
95. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
96. Id. at 642.
97. Id. at 637.
98. Id. at 630.
99. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
100. Id. at 506.
101. Id. at 508.
102.Id.
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In 1975, the Court decided in Goss v. Lopez' that a student
who is suspended from school for a period of ten days or less
is entitled to a due process hearing prior to suspension.'" For more
serious suspensions or expulsions, the Court suggested that more
formal proceedings may be necessary."' In Ingraham v. Wright,"°
however, the Court refused to apply the eighth amendment to dis-
ciplinary corporal punishment in public schools because histori-
cally the amendment pertained to criminal punishment only."°7 The
Court further held that the "Due Process Clause does not require
notice and a hearing prior to the imposition of corporal punish-
ment . . . as that practice is authorized and limited by the com-
mon law [of Florida].1 0 8
The Court seems willing to extend constitutional rights to pub-
lic school students as long as the practice of those rights does not
interfere with the state's interest in providing an effective environ-
ment in which to educate those students. Also, none of these cases
involved a question of criminal prosecution outside of school dis-
ciplinary procedures.
INSTANT CASE
The Supreme Court originally granted the State of New Jer-
sey's petition for certiorari on the question of whether the exclu-
sionary rule operated to bar the evidence in T.L.O.'s juvenile
delinquency proceedings." 9 The state conceded for argument that
the New Jersey Supreme Court had correctly decided that the
search was invalid under the fourth amendment, but argued that
the exclusionary rule did not apply to suppress evidence from an
illegal search conducted by public authorities who were not police
officers.1" The Supreme Court did not wish to decide this issue
without first deciding the broader issue of fourth amendment ap-
plication to school settings, and the case was re-argued on that
issue. "'
In a majority opinion written by Justice White, the Supreme
Court relied on Mapp v. Ohio"' to hold that the fourth amend-
ment, through the fourteenth amendment, applies to state
103. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
104. Id. at 581.
105. Id. at 584.
106. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 682.
109. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 464 U.S. 991 (1983).
110. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 331 (1985).
111. Id. at 332.
112, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See supra text accompanying note 21.
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officers,"' and relied on West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette.4 to hold that it applies to school officials."' In response
to the state's argument that the history of the fourth amendment
indicates that it applies only to searches carried out by law en-
forcement officers, the Supreme Court applied its holding in
Camara v. Municipal Court".6 that the fourth amendment applies
to civil as well as criminal authorities, and rejected the state's ar-
gument.117 The Supreme Court went even further and rejected the
in loco parentis doctrine, which several states had relied on to
rule that the fourth amendment does not apply to school person-
nel at all." 8 The Court reasoned that if, on the one hand, under
its holdings in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District"9 and in Goss v. Lopez,' school officials are sub-
ject to upholding students' first amendment and due process rights,
then school officials cannot act as surrogate parents where stu-
dents' fourth amendment rights are involved.'
The Court next addressed the issue of what standard of reason-
ableness is required in school searches. Again relying on language
from Camara,' the Court suggested that determination of a stan-
dard requires that the Court balance the need to search against
the kind of invasion the search involves, based on a reasonable
expectation of privacy.' The State of New Jersey argued that
the school setting provides no expectation of privacy because such
an expectation is incompatible with an educational environment
and because students have a minimal interest in bringing personal
property to school."' The Court rejected this argument: "In short,
schoolchildren [sic] may find it necessary to carry with them a
variety of legitimate, noncontraband [sic] items, and there is no
reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights
to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school
grounds."' The Court went on to recognize that even a limited
search of a person under Terry v. Ohio" constitutes a substantial
113. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334.
114. 319 U.S 624 (1943); see supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
115. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334.
116. 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
117. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 335.
118. Id. at 741.
119. 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
120. 419 U.S. 565 (1975); see supra text accompanying notes 103-105.
121. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
122. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
123. New Jersey v T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
124. Id. at 338.
125. Id. at 339.
126. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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invasion, and that the search of a closed bag is a severe violation
under its holding in United States v. Ross. 1 27 Likewise, the search
of a child's purse by a school official is a similarly substantial
invasion of privacy. 121
But against these interests, the Court weighed the interest of
school officials in maintaining discipline, just as it weighed the
governmental interests in Terry' 9 and Ross" against such an in-
vasion of privacy. Thus, it first held that school officials need
not have a warrant for a search because the burden of obtaining
a warrant frustrates the object of the search. 3' Second, the Court
reduced the standard from probable cause to reasonable suspi-
cion, 1 2citing Terry v. Ohio,'33 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, "4
Delaware v. Prouse, "' United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, "6 and
Camara."" Each of these cases recognized an exception to the
probable cause standard for warrantless searches after balancing
a legitimate governmental need against the privacy rights of in-
dividuals. The Court then applied a two-pronged test to deter-
mine the reasonableness of the search. Relying on Terry, the Court
looked to 1) whether the search was justified at its inception and
2) whether the search conducted was reasonably related to the
circumstances which justified the search in the first place.13" The
Court then articulated the application of this test:
[A] search of a student will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the
law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopt-
ed are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the
age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."'
Finally, the Court applied this test to the facts of T.L.O.'s case.
Calling the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling a "somewhat
crabbed notion of reasonableness,"' the Supreme Court held that
127. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
128. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337-38.
129. 392 U.S. at 29; see Supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
130. 456 U.S. at 825; see supra note 25.
131. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
132. Id. at 342.
133. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
134. 422 U.S. 873 (1975); see Supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
135. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In this case, a police officer stopped a car for a discretionary spot check of driver's
license and car registration. The officer found marijuana in plain view on the floor of the car. The Court held
that without articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or the car unregistered or without
the car being involved in a violation of law, such a discretionary stop is unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment. Any evidence of marijuana must be suppressed because it was seized upon an invalid stop. Id. at 663.
136. 428 U.S. 543 (1976); see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
137. 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
138. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
139. Id. at 341-42.
140. Id. at 343.
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the search of T.L.O.'s purse by the vice principal was reasona-
ble.' 1 The Court explained that there were two searches-the
search for cigarettes and the search for evidence of marijuana.
The search for cigarettes was justified at its inception because
T.L.O. had been accused of smoking by a teacher, T.L.O. de-
nied smoking in the restroom, and she denied that she smoked
at all. According to the Court, the vice principal had a reasona-
ble suspicion that her purse contained cigarettes, and the search
was confined to her purse. Both prongs of the Court's test were
met by this reasoning. Further, the search revealed rolling papers
which gave the vice principal a reasonable suspicion that the purse
contained marijuana. His continued search through her purse was
justified and the search was confined to the purse, thus meeting
both prongs of the Court's test. The first search, which was valid,
gave rise to the second search, making the second search valid.
Therefore, the evidence obtained in this valid search should not
be excluded in the juvenile delinquency proceedings against
T.L.O.1
42 '
The four related issues which the Court explicitly chose not to
decide in this case were: 1) whether the exclusionary rule is the
appropriate remedy for evidence obtained in an invalid search by
school authorities,'' 2) whether the fourth amendment applies to
searches of lockers, desks, or other school property by school
officials or other public authorities,' 3) what the appropriate stan-
dard is for a search carried out by school authorities in conjunc-
tion with the police,' 4) and whether individualized suspicion
is an essential element of the reasonableness standard for a search
by school officials.
4 6
In their concurrence, Justices Powell and O'Connor emphasized
that public school students have a lesser expectation of privacy
because of the characteristics of the school setting which make
it "unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional protec-
tions granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool setting."'' Their
reasoning is based on the government's interest in maintaining dis-
cipline within the schools so that school officials can perform their
141. Id.
142. Id. at 347-48.
143. Id. at 333 n.3.
144. Id. at 337 n.5.
145. Id. at 341 n.7. The Court cites without comment Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. I11. 1976),
which held that a probable cause standard was necessary for such searches. See supra note 94 and accompany-
ing text.
146. ld. at 342 n.8. The Court implies that individualized suspicion may be necessary unless the provacy
interests in a situation are minimal.
147. Id. at 348.
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primary function-educating young people." 8
Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, also emphasized this spe-
cial governmental interest. He suggested that the balancing test
is an exception to probable cause for warrantless searches, which
the Court has applied only where special governmental interests
are involved, and the school setting falls within that exception.149
Finally, Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens concurred that
the fourth amendment applies to school officials. However,
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented as to the lowering of the
standard from probable cause, finding the balancing test
"Rohrschach-like [sic]" ' and concluding that any such balanc-
ing test that gave the proper weight to the interests of privacy
would not have reached the result it did in this case.51
Justice Stevens based his dissent on two arguments. First, he
stated that the court "unnecessarily and inappropriately reached
out" to decide this constitutional question when the case did not
reach the Court on this issue. 5 Second, Justice Stevens argued
that the standard the Court has reached allows school officials
to search students for violations of any school rule as well as for
violations of law. He would limit applicability of the standard to
reasonable suspicion that a student is violating the law or engag-
ing in conduct which will seriously disrupt the school process.5 '
This standard, Justice Stevens suggested, will offer more protec-
tion for the privacy rights of the students and allow school offi-
cials to maintain adequate discipline. Applying this standard to
the present case, Justice Stevens concluded that T. L. O.'s conduct
was neither unlawful nor seriously disruptive of the school process
and the search was, therefore, unjustified.
154
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The decision in New Jersey v. T.L. 0. carves out a new fourth
amendment standard for application to public school students. The
decision tries to strike a balance among the various state court
rulings by holding, on the one hand, that the fourth amendment
does apply to school searches by school officials and, on the other
148. Id. at 350.
149. Id. at 352.
150. The Rorschach Test, developed by Swiss psychiatrist Hermann Rorschach is a method of psychogical
testing where a person is asked to describe what he sees in ten inkblots which are either black, gray, or with
patches of color. For more information, consult The New Encyclopedia Britannica Micropaedia, 15th ed., s.v.
"Rorschach Test."
151. New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 496 U. S. at 358.
152. Id. at 371.
153. Id. at 378.
154. Id. 384.
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hand, by reducing the standard for such a search to reasonable
suspicion and by eliminating the warrant requirement. The deci-
sion also follows the general view of the courts that the standard
for a school search is a lower one than probable cause due to the
special nature of the school setting and the governmental interest
involved in providing an effective educational environment for
young people."' The decision comports with Supreme Court rul-
ings involving the application of other constitutional rights to
school situations 15 6 by holding that the fourth amendment does
apply to public school students. The court recognizes, as it did
in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,5
that young people do not lose their rights during that part of the
day when they are students." 8 Even the lowering of the standard
to reasonable suspicion is not unexpected. The decisions in
Tinker,"9 Goss,6" and West Virginia State Board of Education1
6
1
were careful to point out that the students who were exercising
their constitutional rights were not interfering with the rights of
other students nor were they disrupting the school process. The
Court recognized the necessity, even in these cases, of maintain-
ing an effective educational atmosphere in the schools.
But, the decision in this case is an unprecedented application
of the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court has extended the
application of this reasonable suspicion standard beyond school
rule infractions to violations of law. Furthermore, it has allowed
a search for evidence of a school rule infraction to evolve into
a search for evidence of criminal conduct. In essence, the Court
has reduced the standard for a warrantless, intrusive search for
criminal evidence to reasonable suspicion.
Granted, the Court has recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement. The automobile exception promulgated in Carrol62
was recognized because evidence of a crime could easily vanish
while a warrant was sought; however, the search was based on
probable cause. While school officials perhaps need not be ham-
pered with the necessity of obtaining a warrant, reasonable sus-
155. See, e.g., State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Nelson v. State, 319 So. 2d 154
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1039 (1975); see supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943); see Supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
157. 393 U. S. 503 (1969).
158. Id. at 506.
159. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969).
160. Goss V. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
161. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
162. 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see supra text accompanying note 25.
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picion for an intrusiye search does not fit within the spirit of the
Carroll exception, even conceding that the necessity for warrant-
less searches is similar in schools and automobiles.
The Court has also recognized an exception to the probable cause
standard for warrantless searches. The Court relies heavily on
the Terry... exception to fashion its lower standard for school
searches. While Terry lowered the standard for a warrantless
search to reasonable suspicion, the exception was specifically
designed to allow police officers to prevent commission of a crime,
and the subsequent search was a limited intrusion specifically made
to protect the officer from an assault with a weapon. 1" Even when
the Court extended the Terry exception to the situation where law
enforcement had a reasonable suspicion that a suspect was trans-
porting narcotics, the stop could be only long enough to dispel
the suspicion and no search could ensue unless there was reason
to believe the suspect was armed and dangerous. 6 '
The application of the Terry exception in this case poses
problems. If the Court applies the exception to school rule in-
fractions, T. L. O.'s vice-principal had a reasonable suspicion that
T.L.O. had been smoking in the restroom, as the teacher alleged.
But it was not a school rule infraction to have cigarettes at school
or to smoke on campus. The infraction was smoking in the rest-
room. There was no reasonable suspicion that the vice-principal
could dispel by searching T.L.O.'s purse for evidence that she
had broken the rule of not smoking in the restroom. Such evi-
dence could not be found in her purse. The Court thus went be-
yond Terry and its progeny when it held that the initial search
of T.L.O.'s purse for cigarettes was valid.
The second search, or continued search of T. L.O.'s purse, poses
an even more perplexing problem. The vice-principal had no
reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. was about to commit or had com-
mitted the crime of possession of drugs. He would have no valid
reason to stop and question her about any suspicious activity un-
der Terry. He only became aware of the possibility that T.L.O.
possessed drugs only when he found the drug paraphernalia dur-
ing the first search. But, the Court hinged the validity of the
second search on the validity of the first one, 6" a search the Court
has gone outside of the scope of Terry to validate. The Court seems
to have hinged an invalid search onto an invalid search and called
it valid.
163. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
164. 392 U.S. at 30.
165. See, e.g., U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
166. New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 469 U. S. 325, 347 (1985).
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The Court also relies on Camara... to support a standard of
reasonable suspicion by bringing from that case the idea of the
balancing test. School searches for school rule infractions have
much in common with administrative searches. Administrative
searches have as their goal promulgation of health and safety stan-
dards or regulation of industry which bears on public health and
safety. Detection of criminal offenses is not their objective, though
evidence found can be used in criminal trials. But a Camara search
of a residence or private commercial property requires a warrant
or legislative notice that a warrantless search can be conducted.""6
And although probable cause does not have to be particularized
to one dwelling or business, but can be based on the reasonable
observation of an area, the warrant still protects citizens against
unreasonable intrusions into their homes or onto their property.
Likewise, school searches for evidence of rule infractions bear
on the health and safety of the students and teachers and also deal
with regulating the educational process. If criminal sanctions are
not the objective of a school search, the standard perhaps can be
lowered to reasonable suspicion because the results to individu-
als are less harsh. However, the Court in the present case applies
a balancing test with a lowered standard to an intrusive search
of a girl's purse based only on reasonable suspicion and without
a warrant. The Court then allows evidence from this intrusive
search to be used in criminal proceedings. The Court, thus, goes
beyond Camara to validate the search of T.L.O.'s purse.
Even in the border patrol cases, where the government's im-
mediate need to search is perhaps at its greatest, the Court has
never reduced the standard for an intrusive search to reasonable
suspicion. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,'"9 the Court reduced
the standard to reasonable suspicion that the car contained illegal
aliens for stopping a car near the border, but the stop could only
be brief.1"' No search could be undertaken on less than probable
cause. 7' The Court also held that in Martinez-Fuerte' that fixed
checkpoint stops were valid along the border, without a warrant
or even without suspicion of any wrongdoing, but only because the
stops were brief and did not involve a search.7: In T.L.O.'s case, the
167. 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see supra notes 54, 58, 67, 122, 137, and accompanying text.
168. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); see
supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text; United States v, Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Corp.
v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
169. 422 U.S. 873 (1975); see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
170. Id. at 881-82.
171. Id.
172. 428 U.S. 543 (1976); see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
173. Id. at 557-67.
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Court has articulated a standard that does not comport with the
standards for border patrol stops and searches. The Court has al-
lowed an intrusive search for evidence of a school rule
infraction - an administrative concern - to extend into a search for
criminal evidence on less than probable cause for either search,
an approach the Court rejected for border patrol searches." '
The uniqueness of the ruling in this case hinges on the concept
that an intrusive search may be undertaken on reasonable suspi-
cion that a school rule has been broken, an administrative con-
cern, or on reasonable suspicion that there is criminal
wrong-doing, and that the evidence obtained by the subsequent
search can be used interchangeably to support either or both
charges. The Court seems to be striving for flexibility between
the two categories of misconduct to allow school officials greater
latitude to initiate a search and use any evidence obtained for pur-
poses of either school disciplinary proceedings or criminal
proceedings. The Court has never before recognized this kind of
exception to fourth amendment search and seizure standards. It
is a unique combination of administrative and criminal searches
with a lower standard applicable to both.
Recognizing that school officials have a legitimate interest in
maintaining discipline, a lowered standard for a brief, limited
scope, nonintrusive search for evidence of a school rule infrac-
tion, which would not be used in criminal proceedings, is useful
and perhaps necessary. This kind of search would avoid the
preposterous situation, which this decision seems to contemplate,
of being able to undertake an intrusive search for non-disruptive
offenses like the search for a pass to prove a student was in the
hallway without one, or a search for car keys to prove the stu-
dent drove a car to school against the rules. Probable cause should
still be the standard for an intrusive search for evidence of crimi-
nal wrong-doing, evidence which can be used in criminal proceed-
ings. This standard should not be difficult to meet considering
that students spend a great part of the school day in close prox-
imity to teachers, school officials, and other students. It seems
logical that if school officials can turn evidence over to the police
for criminal prosecution, they ought to be held to the same stan-
dards as the police in searching for evidence of criminal wrong
doing. Otherwise, the "silver platter" doctrine, which was reject-
ed by the Court in Elkins v. United States,"" has returned for use
174. See, e.g., U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); U.S. v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); U.S.
v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S., 413 U.S. 266 (1973); see supra notes 61-70
and accompanying text.
175. 364 U.S. 206 (1960); see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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in the school context. Still available is the Terry exception that
allows school officials to search for weapons on reasonable sus-
picion that a student may be carrying a weapon at school.
This standard, which would clearly separate searches for school
infractions on the one hand and for criminal wrongdoing on the
other, recognizes the dual nature of school search concerns, ad-
ministrative and criminal. It also allows school officials to main-
tain discipline at two levels, one for school rules and another for
criminal laws. Where these two levels overlap, school officials
will have obtained evidence of criminal wrongdoing under a prob-
able cause standard, and there will be no confusion about whether
the search was undertaken for a rule violation or a law violation.
Under this kind of standard, students will be afforded some right
to privacy, and they will have notice as to what circumstances
may subject them to a search. They will also have notice as to
how extensive this search may be. The danger of the Court's new
standard is that the definition of reasonable suspicion is left to
the discretion of school officials under the circumstances of each
case. Thus, students cannot be sure whether they are being
searched for evidence of a rule infraction or a violation of a law;
nor can they know how intrusive the search may become, short
of a strip search.
Assuming, arguendo, that the standard announced in this case
is comprehensible, the most perplexing aspect of the decision is
the Court's application of the standard to the facts of the case.
The standard, reasonable suspicion that the student has violated
a school rule, does not seem to apply to T.L.O. Smoking was
not a rule violation at Piscataway High School. Smoking outside
the designated area was a rule violation, and a teacher saw T.L.O.
break that rule. No further search for corroborative evidence
should have been necessary. The vice-principal undertook the
search because he had a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had lied
to him about not smoking at all. The vice-principal's search for
cigarettes was not for evidence of a school rule infraction, since
it was not an infraction to have cigarettes at school. It is hard
to understand how this search was justified at its inception. The
Court then allows evidence found in this search to be used in crimi-
nal proceedings. If a student's ability to rely on the fourth amend-
ment for protection of privacy is weakened with the reduction of
the standard, it is virtually destroyed by the standard's applica-
tion to this set of facts. The Court implies that students may be
intrusively searched merely because a school official wishes to
make a point that a student lied to him. The application of this
vague standard to this set of facts implies that the discretion of
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school officials will be given unprecedented credence to uphold
a search under the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court claims that its decision does not reach the
issue of searches conducted in conjunction with police, but cites
Picha7 6 to imply that a probable cause standard would be neces-
sary."'7 It is hard to distinguish the difference between a police
officer looking for evidence of a crime and a school official looking
for evidence of a crime or rule infraction turning over evidence
for criminal proceedings. The end result is the same: the school
official can undertake the search on reasonable suspicion of a
school rule infraction and end up with criminal evidence. In es-
sence, the Court has decided that police involvement can be based
on reasonable suspicion by their accepting and using evidence ob-
tained by a school official based on reasonable suspicion. From
here it seems only a short leap to the situation where law enforce-
ment requests that school officials search students for the police
officers and turn over any evidence of criminal activity to those
officers. The Court also claims not to decide the issue of the stan-
dard for searches of other school property, like lockers and desks,
in which students may store belongings. " By upholding the va-
lidity of an intrusive search of a girl's purse for evidence of a rule
infraction, it has upheld intrusion where a school official has no
arguable right to intrude under normal expectations. Students nor-
mally might expect a school official to have a right to search desks
and lockers since they are school property. It is puzzling why the
Court chooses to rule as it does on a very personal intrusion and
chooses not to comment on the standard for a search of school
property.
Even though the Court holds that the fourth amendment applies
to searches and seizures in schools, " and even though the Court
recites that students have some expectations of privacy,"' the new
standard and its application to this set of facts undercuts this hold-
ing. This unprecedented fourth amendment standard guarantees
little privacy to school students. What effect this decision will have
on school searches will, of course, vary with each state. As the
Court points out, states will be able to set a higher standard for
school searches and seizures and will therefore not rely on this
decision to determine the validity of school searches. 8 Those
176. Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. hi. 1976); see Supra notes 94 and 145 and accompanying text.
177. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 n.7.
178. Id. at 337-38 n.5.
179. Id. at 336-37.
180. Id. at 338.
181. Id. at 343 n.10.
[Vol. 6:149
FOURTH AMENDMENT IN PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS
states which have held that the fourth amendment applies with
probable cause can now choose to lower their standards to fit this
decision or maintain their stricter ones. Those states which held
that school officials were not bound by fourth amendment con-
straints will have to recognize that the fourth amendment applies,
abandon the in loco parentis doctrine and relabel their policy as
"reasonable suspicion under the circumstances."' The Court sim-
ply sets a minimum standard for school searches.
Neither state courts, school officials, nor students have been
given any guidance as to what a valid search may involve. The
Court has said that reasonableness is to be determined by the school
official within the circumstances of each case, taking into account
various characteristics of the student. State courts, in the absence
of more specific guidelines, are still left-the task of determining
what constitutes valid searches under this decision. Perhaps this
is what the Supreme Court really set out to accomplish. Ultimately,
however, school officials will be left to decide the reasonable-
ness of a search. They will have to strike a balance between not
searching to avoid the risk of litigation and taking too many op-
portunities to find reasonable suspicion, rendering fourth amend-
ment protection totaly inoperative for students.
More importantly, this ambiguous standard leaves students with
only the Court's words that they have some expectations of privacy
or that the fourth amendment protects them. The expectations are
minimal at best and the protection uncertain at most.
Gwendolyn G. Combs
182. Id. at 340-41.
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